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Prison on Appeal: The Idea of Communicative Incarceration 
A huge amount of literature in legal and political philosophy is focused on the aims and justifications 
of punishment.1  There is also a considerable body of work devoted to what constitutes a 
proportionate sentence.2  But ethical examinations of the permissible forms of punishment are much 
rarer.3  That research which does exist on this issue tends to focus on the death penalty, torture and 
corporal punishment.4  Almost nothing exists, on the other hand, on the permissibility of the paradigm 
form of punishment in contemporary societies: imprisonment.  A handful of philosophers have 
produced important work outlining the rights of prisoners and evaluating just which crimes are 
deserving of imprisonment, but the question of whether the very practice of imprisonment can be 
justified has been little discussed.5  This omission is both surprising and problematic given that the 
harms that imprisonment produces are so enormous and easy to identify.  After all, the practice of 
imprisonment seems to involve the state routinely infringing individual rights to liberty, privacy, 
freedom of association, and in most prisons systems, many more rights besides.6  This is deeply 
problematic if one assumes that one of the primary functions of the state is to uphold the rights of its 
citizens.  And when other costs of imprisonment are included in the analysis ± such as the harms it 
causes to the friends and family of prisoners, its failure to reduce reoffending, and its enormous cost 
                                                          
1
 For an excellent overview of the philosophical literature on punishment per se, see, R.A. Duff and David 
Garland (eds.), A Reader on Punishment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).   
2
 For an excellent summary of the philosophical work on proportionate sentencing, see Andrew von Hirsch and 
Andrew Ashworth (eds.), Proportionate Sentencing: Exploring the Principles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005). 
3
 Antony Duff makes the same point about a lack of philosophical attention to forms of punishment in R.A. 
Duff,  ‘Penal CommƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ PZĞĐĞŶƚtŽƌŬŝŶƚŚĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŽĨWƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ? ?Crime and Justice 20 (1996): pp. 
1-97, at p. 57. 
4
 On the death penalty, see Matthew H. Kramer, The Ethics of Capital Punishment: A Philosophical 
Investigation of Evil and its Consequences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); on torture, see Stanford 
Levinson (ed.), Torture: A Collection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); and on corporal punishment, see 
<ĞǀŝŶDƵƌƚĂŐŚ ? ‘Is Corporally WƵŶŝƐŚŝŶŐƌŝŵŝŶĂůƐĞŐƌĂĚŝŶŐ ? ? ?Journal of Political Philosophy 20 (2012): pp. 
481-498.  
5
 Richard L. Lippke, Rethinking Imprisonment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); William Bülow ? ‘dŚĞ
Harms Beyond Imprisonment: Do We Have Special Moral Obligations Towards the Families and Children of 
WƌŝƐŽŶĞƌƐ ? ? ?Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2014): pp. 775-789; and William Bülow ? ‘dƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ/ŶŵĂƚĞƐĂƐ
Moral Agents: A Defense for the Right ƚŽWƌŝǀĂĐǇŝŶWƌŝƐŽŶ ? ?Criminal Justice Ethics 33 (2014): pp. 1-20. 
6
 /ŵƉƌŝƐŽŶŵĞŶƚ ‘ƐĞĞŵƐ ?ƚŽĚŽƚŚŝƐ W but may not if one adopts the view that criminals forfeit their rights upon 
ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŽĨĂĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůĂĐƚ ?^ĞĞŚƌŝƐƚŽƉŚĞƌ,ĞĂƚŚtĞůůŵĂŶ ? ‘dŚĞZŝŐŚƚƐ&ŽƌĨĞŝƚƵƌĞdŚĞŽƌǇŽĨWƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ? ?
Ethics 122 (2012): pp. 371-393. 
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to taxpayers - the need for an ethical evaluation of the practice of imprisonment becomes even more 
urgent.   
 The most obvious way for such an evaluation to proceed is to identify the aims and principles 
that we want a system of criminal punishment to fulfil, and then to assess whether imprisonment can 
meet them.  Indeed, this very method was that employed by sociologist Thomas Mathieson in his 
classic abolitionist text, Prison on Trial.  In that book, Mathieson forcefully argues that imprisonment 
cannot be justified by appeal to any standard punitive aim.7  First, he argues that it cannot be justified 
in terms of rehabilitation, because the evidence shows that prison does not rehabilitate offenders, and 
its condition as a large authoritarian bureaucracy suggests that it cannot rehabilitate.8  Second, 
Mathieson argues that it cannot be justified in terms of general prevention, because while some 
studies purport to show a link between deterrence and probability of sanction, none shows a link to 
mode of sanction.9  Third, Mathieson argues that prison cannot be justified in terms of incapacitation, 
on the basis that incapacitation violates core legal and ethical principles by punishing people for 
something they have not done, and may never do.10  And finally, Mathieson argues that prison cannot 
be justified on the grounds of desert, because determining the precise degree of pain any offender 
merits is impossible, and it is futile to hope that some specific period of time locked up in jail can 
effectively deliver it.11   
7KH DLP RI WKLV SDSHU LV QRW WR HYDOXDWH 0DWKLHVRQ¶V FODLPV RQ HDFK RI WKHse points; for 
present purposes it will assume that they are valid. Instead, the aim of this paper is to give prison an 
µDSSHDO KHDULQJ¶ WR examine whether imprisonment can be justified by a set of punitive aims not 
considered by Mathieson. In particular, it asks whether imprisonment might be justified by the 
µFRPPXQLFDWLYHWKHRU\¶RIpunishment proposed by Antony Duff.  7KHLPSOLFDWLRQVRI'XII¶VWKHRU\
for imprisonment are particularly important to explore for at least two reasons.  First of all, his 
communicative theory is now one of the most sophisticated, established and influential theories of 
punishment, offering something quite distinctive to the familiar consequentialist and retributivist 
                                                          
7
 Thomas Mathieson, Prison on Trial (Winchester: 3
rd
 ed. Waterside Press, 2006). 
8
 Ibid. pp. 27-54. 
9
 Ibid. pp. 55-84. 
10
 Ibid. pp. 85-107. 
11
 Ibid. pp. 108-140. 
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alternatives.12  Furthermore, not only has Duff defended and outlined a powerful and imaginative 
justification of punishment per se, he has also ± unlike so many other theorists of punishment ± given 
serious attention to the particular forms of punishment that would be justified under his theory.  
Crucially, Duff sees imprisonment as having a role within his account of punishment.  While Duff is 
absolutely clear that the use of imprisonment should be reduced dramatically in a society with a 
properly communicative criminal justice system, he is also explicit that imprisonment ought to hold a 
prominent place within it.13  Three separate rationales for the use of imprisonment can be found 
ZLWKLQ'XII¶VZULWLQJ)irst, he argues that imprisonment is required as the ultimate sanction for those 
that wilfully fail to comply with all other forms of punishment.14 Second, he claims that prison can 
form an DSSURSULDWH VKRFN RU VWLPXOXV WR DQ RIIHQGHU¶V UHSHQWDQFH.15 AQG 'XII¶V WKLUG DQG PRVW
prominent argument is that imprisonment VHUYHVDVDµV\PEROLFDOO\DSSURSULDWH¶IRUPRISXQLVKPHQW
for those who have committed crimes which seriously undermine the µVRFLDODQGPRUDOERQGV¶ZKLFK
hold a community together.16 
The purpose of this paper, then, is to ask whether these communicative rationales offer a 
convincing basis with which to justify imprisonment.  This will not be done by evaluating the merits 
of the communicative theory itself ± for much has been written on that topic elsewhere in the 
literature.17  Instead, it will assume that the RYHUDOOWHQHWVRI'XII¶V theory are sound, and ask whether 
                                                          
12
 For instance, standard texts on the philosophy of punishment now include accounts of the communicative 
theory alongside more traditional retributivist and consequentialist theories.  For example, see Thom Brooks, 
Punishment (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012). 
13
 R.A. Duff, Punishment, Communication and Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 149-151; 
R.A. Duff, Trials and Punishments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 282-3; R.A. Duff, 
 ‘WƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ?ŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ? in Matt Matravers (ed.), Punishment and Political Theory 
(Oxford: Hart, 1999), pp. 48- ? ? ?ĂƚƉ ? ? ? ?ƵĨĨ ? ‘WĞŶĂůŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ?Z ? ?ƵĨĨ ? ‘ůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƐƚŽ
Punishment  W ŽƌůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞWƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚƐ ? ? ? in Wesley Cragg (ed.), Retributivism and Its Critics (Stuttgart: 
Steiner, 1992), pp. 43- ? ? ?ĂƚƉ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚZ ? ?ƵĨĨ ? ‘WƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ?ǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶĂŶĚWĞŶĂŶĐĞ ? ? in H. Jung, H. Müller-
Dietz and U. Neumann (eds.), Recht und Moral (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlasgsgesellschaft, 1991), pp. 235-248, 
at pp. 243-4. 
14
 Duff, Punishment, Communication and Community, p. 152. 
15
 Duff, Trials and Punishments, p. 283. 
16
 Duff, Punishment, Communication and Community, p. 149 ?ƵĨĨ ? ‘Alternatives to Punishment  W or Alternative 
WƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚƐ ? ? ?Ɖ ?  ?  ?ƵĨĨ ? ‘WƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ?ŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?Ɖ ? 60; Duff, Trials and Punishments, 
p. 282; DƵĨĨ ? ‘WĞŶĂůŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?Ɖ ?  ? ĂŶĚƵĨĨ ? ‘WƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ?ǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶĂŶĚWĞŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?Ɖ ? 243. 
17
 &ŽƌũƵƐƚĂĨĞǁŶŽƚĂďůĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐƐĞĞDŝĐŚĂĞůĂǀŝƐ ? ‘WƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚĂƐ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ PDŝƐůĞĂĚŝng Analogy for 
ĞƐĞƌƚdŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ ? ? Law and Philosophy 10 (1991): pp. 311-322 ?ŶĚƌĞǁsŽŶ,ŝƌƐĐŚ ? ‘WƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ?WĞŶĂŶĐĞĂŶĚ
the State: A Reply ƚŽƵĨĨ ? ? in Matt Matravers (ed.), Punishment and Political Theory (Oxford: Hart, 1999), pp. 
69-82; and Matt MatrĂǀĞƌƐ ? ‘ƵĨĨŽŶ,ĂƌĚdƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ ? ? in R. Cruft, M. Kramer and M. Reiff (eds.), Crime, 
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prison can plausibly be said to have a role within it.   As such, the argument proceeds in four stages.  
The first section offers a brief sketch RI'XII¶VFRPPXQLFDWLYH WKHRU\DQG LWVPDLQHOHPHQWV.  This 
includes a summary of the different modes of punishment Duff regards as appropriate within a 
communicative system of criminal justice, and his reasoning.  The next three sections then explore 
each of 'XII¶VUDWLRQDOHVIRU giving imprisonment a role within such a system: that it is the ultimate 
sanction; that it can act as a shock to repentance; and that it is symbolically appropriate.  The paper 
argues that none of these rationales succeeds in justifying imprisonment, and that a communicative 
penal system trXO\ LQ OLQH ZLWK 'XII¶V WKHRU\ Zould not include imprisonment.  The ultimate 
conclusion of the paper is thus that imprisonment cannot be justified by appeal to the communicative 
aims outlined by Duff; in other words, this particular µDSSHDO¶ IDLOV :KHWKHU LPSULVRQPHQWFDQEH
justified by any alternative penal or other goals is beyond the scope of this paper and left to future 
research. 
 
1. The Communicative Purpose of Punishment 
'XII¶V FRPPXQLFDWLYH WKHRU\ RI SXQLVKPHQW LV LQ SDUW LQVSLUHG E\ ROGHU µH[SUHVVLYLVW¶ DFFRXQWV RI
punishment, where the fundamental aim of punishment is to convey to the offender feelings of 
disapproval.18  However, it seeks to improve upon such theories by not regarding the offender as a 
passive recipient of such messages, but instead as an integral participant in a two-way dialogue: 
Criminal punishment, I argue, should communicate to offenders the censure they deserve for 
their crimes and should aim through that communicative process to persuade them to repent 
those crimes, to try to reform themselves, and thus to reconcile themselves with those whom 
they have wronged.19 
,QWKLVZD\'XII¶VFRPmunicative theory improves upon expressivist accounts by treating offenders 
as responsible moral agents who are asked to understand the wrong they have done and to repent it. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Punishment, and Responsibility: The Jurisprudence of Antony Duff (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011), pp. 
68-84. 
18
 :ŽĞů&ĞŝŶďĞƌŐ ? ‘dŚĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ&ƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŽĨWƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ? ?The Monist 49 (1965): pp. 397-423.  
19
 Duff, Punishment, Communication and Community, p. xvii. 
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Furthermore, it also explains the rationale for inflicting hard treatment upon the offender.  After all, 
many have pointed out that if the sole aim of punishment were to express censure to the criminal, this 
could be done without the need for hard treatment: a trial, conviction and public condemnation seem 
like perfectly effective ways of conveying the message of censure.  And Duff himself sees these non-
punitive aspects of the criminal justice process as absolutely crucial to the communicative dialogue.20  
However, LQ 'XII¶V WKHRU\ WKH hard treatment of punishment is not a supplement to the 
communicative process, but an integral part of it.  For it is important to note that the communicative 
theory is fundamentally retributive, and seeks an appropriate response from the offender for the wrong 
that they have done.  As such, the hard treatment of punishment is absolutely essential to the 
communicative process: it serves as a penance that the offender is required to undergo in order to 
focus her mind on her wrongdoing and to repair the broken relationship with those she has wronged, 
which includes the wider community.  
,Q'XII¶V theory, then, punishment is an appropriate method of communication for criminal 
behaviour.  To reiterate, punishment is not the only part of the communicative enterprise ± the trial 
and conviction play important roles too ± but without doubt the hard treatment of punishment is an 
integral part of the communicative dialogue between state and offender.  As such, it makes perfect 
sense for Duff to endorse those particular forms of punishment that can reasonably serve in 
communicating that moral message$V'XIIZULWHVµOn the account I have developed and defended 
elsewhere, the communicative purpose of criminal punishment runs all the way down, even to the 
MXVWLILFDWLRQ«RISDUWLFXODUNLQGVRIKDUGWUHDWPHQWSXQLVKPHQW¶21   
Of course, it is important to note that Duff does not mean that punishment and particular 
forms of punishment can only be justified if they do in actual fact end up realising their 
communicative aims.  As has been pointed out by critics, and acknowledged by Duff himself, it is 
undoubtedly true that for some offenders ± like psychopaths and the like ± effective moral 
                                                          
20
 R.A. Duff, Lindsay Farmer, Sandra Marshall and Victor Tadros, The Trial on Trial Volume 3 (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2007). 
21
 ƵĨĨ ? ‘WƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ?ŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? 
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communication will prove to be impossible.22  And such communication will also be ineffective for 
offenders who have already acknowledged the wrongfulness of their actions and the need for reform 
in advance of receiving punishment.23  For Duff, it is not the actual success of communication that 
justifies hard treatment, but the attempt to communicate censure that is deserved for a moral 
wrongdoing:  
The moral possibility of trials and punishments does not, of course, depend upon their actual 
success in bringing wrongdoers to engage in the communicative enterprise, or to answer for, 
to repent, or to make amends for their crimes: we must address the wrongdoer as someone 
wKRFRXOGUHVSRQGDSSURSULDWHO\«24 
So what forms of punishment does Duff see as appropriate methods within a wider system of 
communicative criminal justice?  Duff identifies and endorses four examples of effective 
communicative punishments. Importantly, these four modes of punishment are not mutually exclusive 
and are often combined in particular punitive bundles.  The first form of punishment endorsed by Duff 
is properly constructed victim-offender mediation programmes.25  Obviously the explicit aim of such 
schemes is FRPPXQLFDWLYH LQ 'XII¶V WHUPV µ«to bring the offender to recognise the nature and 
implications of what she has done, and thus to make material RUV\PEROLFUHSDUDWLRQIRU LW¶26  The 
second mode of punishment Duff endorses is probation.  After all, WKHRIIHQGHU¶V supervision by a 
probation officer itself communicates both a condemnatory judgement and that his standing and trust 
in the community has diminished. Furthermore, the specific restrictions and conditions imposed by 
the probation order could also help the offender confront the wrongfulness of his behaviour.27  Third, 
Duff also cites approvingly certain education programmes and forms of training, such as those 
imposed upon violent offenders, which confront offenders with the impact of their behaviour, and 
                                                          
22
 DuĨĨ ? ‘WĞŶĂůŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Z ? ?ƵĨĨ ? ‘ĂŶǁĞWƵŶŝƐŚƚŚĞWĞƌƉĞƚƌĂƚŽƌƐŽĨƚƌŽĐŝƚŝĞƐ ? ? ? in T. Brudholm and T. Cushman (eds.), The 
Religious in Response to Mass Atrocity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2009), pp. 79-104, at p. 91. 
25
 Duff, Punishment, Communication and Community, p. 92. 
26
 ƵĨĨ ? ‘WƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ?ŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?Ɖ ?53. 
27
 ƵĨĨ ? ‘Alternatives to Punishment  W or ůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞWƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚƐ ? ? ?ƉƉ ? 56-8. 
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which help them to develop strategies to better deal with the triggers of their criminal activity.28 
Finally, Duff claims that community service orders can also serve communicative processes well.  
After all, the service embodies a public apology and a means by which a repentant offender can make 
up to the community.29  Furthermore, specific types of community service ± such as vandals cleaning 
up a neighbourhood, or drunken drivers working as cleaners or porters in a hospital accident unit - 
may help non-repentant offenders face up to the implications of their actions.30   
Once again, Duff is not making the implausible claim that these modes of punishment will 
always be effective in establishing communicative dialogue; instead he is making the much more 
modest claim that each of these forms of sanction, when appropriately employed, are rationally 
connected to the communicative enterprise of punishment.  $QG 'XII¶V UHDVRQLQJ KHUH VHHPV
perfectly plausible. For one, each of these forms of sanction imposes a significant burden on the 
offender, notably through some significant restriction on liberty, thus ensuring that the retributive 
condition of imposing a penance for moral wrongdoing is satisfied.  Secondly, while the hard 
treatment entailed by each of these forms of sanction is retributive, it also serves wider 
communicative purposes: it is directly linked to helping offenders understand the nature and 
implications of their crimes.  Each of these modes of punishment confronts the offender with the 
wrongfulness of what they have done, thus facilitating (but not coercing) repentance and reform.  
Thirdly, while each of these sanctions does impose a significant burden, none is so painful and severe 
thaW WKH PRUDO PHVVDJH EHLQJ FRPPXQLFDWHG LV OLNHO\ WR EH µGURZQHG RXW¶  )LQDOO\ each of these 
means of punishment also aims to facilitate the goal of reconciliation through keeping the penance 
within and related to the community, thus aiming to reintegrate the offenders to society once the 
penance has been paid.31  
 Duff is justifiably less persuaded that fines are appropriately communicative: µ«WKH\ODFNWKH
more richly communicative, reparative, and rehabilitative character of the kinds of punishment which 
                                                          
28
 Ibid. p. 54. 
29
 Duff, Punishment, Communication and Community, p. 106. 
30
 ƵĨĨ ? ‘Alternatives to Punishment  W or ůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞWƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚƐ ? ? ?ƉƉ ? 55-6. 
31
 Duff, Punishment, Communication and Community, p. 98. 
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I have discussed here.  This suggests we should limit rather than extend their use.¶32  However, Duff 
does envisage some situations in which fines may be of use in relation to certain crimes concerned 
with material greed.33  But more persuasive is his claim - which seems to contradict the 
aforementioned limited endorsement of fines ± that fining offenders may have the problematic 
consequence of misleading them LQWREHOLHYLQJWKDWWKHLUFULPHVFDQEHµSDLGIRU¶LQSXUHO\PRQHtary 
terms.34  Reparations, of course, are a different matter.  And given that communicative punishments 
ought to impose a penance through which the offender might achieve reconciliation, one can certainly 
see how the payment of reparations to victims or society might play a role in a communicative penal 
system.  In any case, a full analysis of the proper role of fines and reparations in a communicative 
system of criminal justice is beyond the scope of this paper.  The important point to take is that Duff 
sees some forms of punishment, such as victim-offender mediation programmes and community 
service, as rationally connected to the enterprise of communicative punishment, and others, such as 
fines, as poorly connected to that enterprise.  What we must evaluate next is his analysis of 
imprisonment.     
 Given that imprisonment is µexclusionary¶ ± that is, a sanction which takes the offender out of 
the community which he has wronged and to which he must be reintegrated ± Duff admits that 
imprisonment does not look promising as a means of communicative punishment.35  After all, it 
conflicts directly with the communicative ambition of reconciliation.  Because of this, and as stated 
above, Duff is explicit that a penal system pursuing communicative goals would make far less use of 
imprisonment compared to current practice in contemporary societies; mediation, probation, 
education programmes and community service would be the preferred alternatives.  Nonetheless, as 
also stated above, Duff does believe that imprisonment has an important role in a communicative 
criminal justice system: to serve as the ultimate sanction; to shock certain offenders to repentant 
                                                          
32
 ƵĨĨ ? ‘Alternatives to Punishment  W or ůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞWƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚƐ ? ? ?Ɖ ? 60. 
33
 Duff ? ‘WƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ?ǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶĂŶĚWĞŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?Ɖ ?244; and Duff, Punishment, Communication and Community, 
p. 147. 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 Ibid. p. 149. 
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understanding; and to act as a symbolically appropriate sanction.  The remainder of the paper will 
critically evaluate each of these rationales in turn; and it will also argue that each fails.  
 
2. Imprisonment as the Ultimate Sanction 
The first basis on which Duff finds a place for imprisonment within his theory of communicative 
punishment is to serve as the µultimate sanction¶ for those that wilfully fail to comply with all other 
forms of punishment.36  It is perhaps no surprise that Duff makes this argument.  After all, it certainly 
seems likely that some offenders will resist or refuse to participate in mediation, probation, education 
programmes or community service.  Surely it is thus necessary to have some ultimate threat such as 
imprisonment RSHUDWLQJµabove¶ WKHVHVDQFWLRQVWRHLWKHU ensure that offenders comply, or to secure 
that all offenders do serve some kind of penance.  
The problem with this justification is twofold.  In the first place, it is entirely unclear why 
imprisonment should play the role of the ultimate sanction.  After all, there are plenty of other types 
of coercive sanction that could be used to ensure compliance or to guarantee that a penance is paid.  
Indeed, if the main point of this ultimate sanction is to persuade offenders to comply with the 
µstandard¶ punishments imposed upon them, it is only reasonable to surmise that threats of corporal 
punishment or even death could work more effectively than that of imprisonment.  The selection of 
imprisonment for this role thus seems somewhat arbitrary. 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the very idea of an ultimate sanction or threat 
FRQIOLFWVZLWK'XII¶VZLGHU WKHRU\ 7RH[SODLQ Duff is quite clear that hard treatment punishment 
must respect offenders as responsible moral agents.  The coercive hard treatment must persuade them 
of their moral wrong and the need for repentance; proper respect must not manipulate offenders into 
repentance: 
If I am to respect another as a rational moral agent, I need not refrain from trying to persuade 
her to modify her conduct: respect does not preclude attempted persuasion.  Respect does, 
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KRZHYHUSUHFOXGHPDQLSXODWLRQRUFRHUFLRQ«WKDWLV,VKRXOGDWWHPSWPRGLI\KHUFRQGXFW
only by giving her relevant reasons to modify it herself.37 
,PSRUWDQWO\WKHVHµUHOHYDQWUHDVRQV¶PXVWEHUDWLRQDODQGPRUDO,ILQVWHDGWKH\DUHSUXGHQWLDOµ«E\
threatening to inflict harm on her if she remains unpersuaded, I cease to treat her or respect her as a 
ratLRQDOPRUDODJHQW«¶38 
This concern for treating individuals as rational moral agents and his wariness of 
manipulation makes Duff critical of two alternative theories of punishment.  First of all, he claims that 
consequentialist theories of punishment which justify hard treatment solely on the basis that they 
serve some goal such as rehabilitation or deterrence fail to show respect to moral agents and instead, 
to paraphrase Hegel, treat men like dogs.39  In other words, consequentialist theories treat offenders as 
mere instruments to the achievement of some broader social goal.  But Duff is also critical of rival 
communicative theories ± like that offered by Andrew Von Hirsch ± which include not only a 
message of condemnation in moral terms, but also DµSUXGHQWial VXSSOHPHQW¶RIKDUGWUHDWPHQW.40  To 
explain, Von Hirsch argues that the only way hard treatment can be justified is not as a moral 
message, but as DµSUXGHQWLDOVXSSOHPHQW¶WRWKDWPHVVDJH7KHKDUGWUHDWPHQWLVDQDGGLWLRQWRWKH 
communication of moral censure ± which can be provided simply by conviction and condemnation - 
providing an incentive for morally imperfect beings to obey the law.  But Duff is critical of providing 
self-interested incentives in this way, on the basis thaWWKHVHSUXGHQWLDOUHDVRQVµ«ZLOOUHSODFHUDWKHU
than merely suppOHPHQW WKH ODZ¶VPRUDOYRLFH¶41  In other words, the threat of some form of hard 
WUHDWPHQW WR GHWHU RIIHQGHUV IURP IXWXUH FULPH ZLOO HQG XS µGURZQLQJ RXW¶ WKH PRUDO PHVVDJH RI
punishment, impeding the possibility of moral persuasion and reform.42 
However, by using LPSULVRQPHQWDVµWKHXOWLPDWHVDQFWLRQ¶IRUWKRVH who wilfully resist other 
forms of sanction, Duff¶V WKHRU\ too is manipulating rather than persuading. He is also offering 
                                                          
37
 DuĨĨ ? ‘WĞŶĂůŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? 
38
 Ibid. 
39
 ^ĞĞƚŚĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨ,ĞŐĞů ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨƉƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚŝŶdŚŽŵƌŽŽŬƐ ?,ĞŐĞů ?ƐWŽůŝƚŝĐĂůWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ P
Systematic Reading of the Philosophy of Right (Edinburgh: 2
nd
 ed., Edinburgh University Pres, 2013), p. 44. 
40
 Von Hirsch,  ‘WƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ?WĞŶĂŶĐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞ^ƚĂƚĞ PZĞƉůǇƚŽƵĨĨ ?. 
41
 DuĨĨ ? ‘WĞŶĂůŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? 
42
 ƵĨĨ ? ‘WƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ?ŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?Ɖ ?55. 
11 
 
prudential incentives for compliance with the non-custodial sentence.  After all, the threat of 
imprisonment µKDQJVRYHU¶offenders who are tempted not to comply with non-custodial punishments, 
manipulating them into compliance.  This threat thus seems likely to µGURZQRXW¶ WKHSURSHUPRUDO 
message of properly communicative sanctions, and thus to impede the process of moral persuasion.  
Of course, Duff might respond that imprisonment is not intended as a threat, nor as a manipulation 
tool to garner compliance.  Instead, it is merely in place to ensure that some appropriate penance for 
the wrongdoing takes place, and thus also to communicate to offenders that the community takes their 
infractions seriously.  But while imprisonment might not be intended as a threat, it still performs the 
function of a threat: it states explicitly that offenders must comply with the sanctions, for if they do 
not, they will receive a prison term.  This kind of message is in conflict with the aims and purpose of 
the communicative theory of punishment.   
In response, it might be argued that all forms of punishment are coercive and manipulative.  
After all, offenders do not volunteer for or choose hard treatment, it is imposed upon them against ± 
or rather irrespective of - their will.  AV VXFK FULWLFLVLQJ 'XII¶V HQGRUVHPHQW RI LPSULVRQPHQW IRU
being coercive and manipulative is surely unfair: all punishment has these features, so perhaps Duff is 
entitled to justify particular forms of it that coerce and manipulate.  But while it is of course true that 
punishment is coercive in the sense that it is forced upon offenders, this is not the type of coercion 
that Duff is concerned with when he criticises consequentialist and communicative theories that entail 
a prudential supplement.  Duff is quite happy to accept that punishment is imposed upon offenders 
against their will: this is what they deserve for their moral wrongdoing.  The problem arises when the 
proposed imposed punishment seeks to manipulate offenders ± say with threats or prudential 
incentives ± into desired forms of behaviour.  Out of respect for moral agents, the aim of punishment 
for Duff must be to persuade rather than manipulate.  However, by threatening to inflict a harmful 
prison sentence on an offender who refuses the communicative non-custodial sentence, Duff is 
straightforwardly manipulating offenders into desired forms of behaviour.  The choice facing the 
offender is clear: enter the communicative dialogue, or go to jail. 
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3. Imprisonment as a Shock to Repentance 
Of course, this choice may not be quite so problematic if imprisonment itself were communicative.  If 
a jail term could also be communicative, then it would not act as a manipulative threat to induce 
appropriate behaviour, but would actually serve as a proper part of a communicative penance.  It is 
clear that Duff does believes that imprisonment can be appropriately communicative in two distinct 
ways. The next section looks at how Duff believes that imprisonment can serve to usefully 
communicate to offenders the break they have made with the community and its values.   This section 
examines the claim that imprisonment can be appropriately communicative insofar as it can provide a 
shock to repentance.  Duff writes: 
And even a short prison term, if administered and received in the right spirit, can provide a 
VWLPXOXVWRDQGH[SUHVVLRQIRUDFULPLQDO¶VUHSHQWDQWXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKHµVKRUWVKDUSVKRFN¶RI
DEULHILPSULVRQPHQWRUHYHQWKHµFODQJRIWKHSULVRQJDWH¶LWVHOf, could ideally serve, not as a 
prudential deterrent, but as an adequately communicative and penitential punishment .43 
The idea is that imprisonment is a sanction of such severity that it can be useful in focusing the 
RIIHQGHU¶VDWWHQWLRQRQWRWKHZURQJIXOQDWXUHRIWKHFULPHµ«and thus to induce in him the painful 
recognition of hLVZURQJGRLQJ¶44  As such, Duff believes that imprisonment can indeed serve as a 
useful tool in a properly communicative penal system by effectively delivering the moral message of 
wrongdoing. 
However, there are at least two important problems with this view.  The first is that it can end 
up proving too much. For it is once again unclear why imprisonment ± and not other severe forms of 
punishment ± should serve as the appropriate stimulus to repentant understanding.  Indeed, the idea 
that a harsh sanction can shock individuals into a more rational and moral frame of mind is 
remarkably similar to standard justifications of corporal punishment. For example, the Islamic scholar 
Ustadh Mahmoud justifies the penalty of 100 lashes for fornication by an unmarried male in the 
following way:  
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The fornicator sought easy pleasure without regard for the 6KDUL¶D so he is made to suffer 
pain in order to recover his senses.  By pulling the self to pain, when it succumbs to 
prohibited pleasure, he re-establishes a certain equilibrium and avoids recklessness and 
folly.45   
Other cruel punishments have also received similar justifications.  For example, the so-called 
µVHSDUDWHV\VWHP¶used in certain Victorian prisons imposed extremely harsh conditions on inmates: 
prisoners were kept in solitary confinement for the majority of their stay; there was a general rule of 
complete silence; and when inmates were permitted outside of their cells, they were required to wear 
peaked caps that covered their faces, to prevent any kind of communication with others.  Crucially for 
our purposes, such a regime was instigated precisely for the same reasons Duff gives for 
imprisonment: to provide a context and stimulus for prisoners to fully reflect on their moral 
wrongdoing, to repent their crimes, and to reform themselves.46  
So Duff¶V reasoning that imprisonment can be justified on the basis that it can act as a shock 
to repentant understanding proves too much: it can end up justifying corporal punishments and other 
similarly cruel sanctions. Duff would respond that his theory explicitly condemns grossly oppressive 
punishments such as corporal punishment.  This is because a properly communicative penal system 
must address the offender as a rational agent.  Corporal punishments, on the other hand, address 
offenders like animals: as creatures to be trained and manipulated into appropriate behaviour by the 
delivery of a physically painful stimulus.47  But this response misunderstands the nature of corporal 
punishment and neglects the fact that corporal punishments can also address offenders as rational 
agents. Indeed, the justifications of both the lashes and of the separate system outlined above assume 
that a moral message is being provided to a rational agent.  These punishments inflict pain for a 
communicative purpose: for stimulating the offender into moral clarity.  This is precisely the rationale 
that Duff gives for imprisonment.  Now we might say ± quite rightly in my view - that corporal 
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punishments are extremely unlikely to provide that appropriate stimulus: the pains they cause are 
bound to reduce rather than enhance the rational faculty, thus hindering repentance.  But of course the 
same can be said for imprisonment.  In fact, there may even be reason to believe that imprisonment 
will have a more deleterious effect on proper reasoning compared to corporal punishments.  After all, 
corporal punishments are gHQXLQHO\µVKRUWDQGVKDUS¶ZKLOH WKHµSDLQVRI imprisonment¶ tend to last 
over a much longer term.48 
$QGWKLVOHDGVXVWRWKHVHFRQGSUREOHPZLWK'XII¶s claim that imprisonment can be justified 
in terms of it providing an appropriate shock to repentance: as we will see, the empirical evidence 
suggests that imprisonment is a particularly poor vehicle for inducing rational reflection, moral clarity 
and repentance.  As such, it seems extremely odd to include it as part of a properly communicative 
penal system.  For to reiterate, while Duff is clear that forms of punishment should not be evaluated 
by their actual success in achieving communicative goals, he is understandably adamant that the 
FRPPXQLFDWLYHSXUSRVHRISXQLVKPHQWµUXQVDOOWKHZD\GRZQ¶WRWKHMXVWLILFDWLRQRISDUWLFXODUIRUPV
of sanction.  In other words, we might say that a specific PRGHRISXQLVKPHQW PXVWEH µUDWLRQDOO\
FRQQHFWHG¶ WRWKHFRPPXQLFDWLYe enterprise of punishment in order for it to be justified.  There are 
three sets of empirical reasons to believe that imprisonment is not rationally connected to stimulating 
moral reflection and repentance. 
First of all, there are good reasons to believe that the µpains of imprisonment¶will drown out 
messages of wrongfulness, and the need for penance.  That is to say, it is extremely likely that a 
prison term will not focus offenders¶ minds upon their moral wrongdoing, but will instead focus them 
on the pains that their incarceration entails.  The pains of imprisonment are well-documented in the 
criminological literature.  Gresham Sykes in The Society of Captives famously claimed that the end of 
corporal punishment in many societies did not mean the end of painful punishments.  He pointed out 
that imprisonment imposes a number of significant and painful deprivations: of liberty, security, 
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goods and services, autonomy and heterosexual relationships.49  It is only reasonable to surmise that 
such painful experiences are likely to overwhelm messages of moral censure. 
Of course, Duff will no doubt respond that his support of prisons only extends to less 
restrictive and more rehabilatitative forms of the institution.  These types of incarceration, it might be 
argued, are far less likely to drown out moral messages.  But once again, the empirical evidence gives 
us good reason to doubt this.  For example, Ben Crewe has shown that while many contemporary 
prison regimes may not impose such severe deprivations on inmates as they did in the past - and may 
even in some contexts offer real opportunities for prisoners - they are nevertheless experienced 
painfully by inmates.  Following his extensive empirical research on prison life, Crewe argues that the 
µQHZ¶SDLQVRILPSULVRQPHQWDUHH[SHULHQFHGDVDIRUPRIµSV\FKRORJLFDOWLJKWQHVV¶E\LQPDWHVFor 
example, complex sentencing conditions leave inmates uncertain and confused about their futures; 
psychological assessments and cognitive-behavioural courses are highly intrusive and emotionally 
demanding; and risk assessments leave prisoners anxious to avoid saying and doing the wrong things 
to jeopardise release.50  It is only reasonable to assume that an institution which delivers such routine 
pains on offenders serves not as a useful vehicle for moral and rational repentant understanding, but as 
a serious impediment to it.    
Secondly, not only is there good reason to believe that the pains of imprisonment will drown 
out any moral message that hopes to be conveyed through punishment, but it may also completely 
undermine it.  After all, being deliberately inflicted with pain by others is not something that is 
usually received in a calm and dispassionate manner.  The pains of imprisonment, much like other 
pains, are usually received with resentment, hostility or even despair.  A.J. Skillen sums this point up 
extremely well: 
$V IDUDV WKHSHUVRQSXQLVKHG LV FRQFHUQHG WKH µKDUG WUHDWPHQW¶ UDSLGO\EHFRPHV LWVHOI the 
focus of attention, an object of resentment and hostility.  Remorse, which is pain at the wrong 
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GRQH LV RYHUULGGHQE\SDLQ DW WKH WUHDWPHQWEHLQJ UHFHLYHG :KDW µJHWV DFURVV¶ WKHQ LV D
dHPRUDOL]LQJVHQVHRILVRODWLRQ«51 
Furthermore, empirical studies have demonstrated that LPSULVRQPHQW FDQ VHULRXVO\ UHGXFH LQPDWHV¶
feelings of personal control.52  And most tellingly, a recent empirical study on the effects of 
imprisonment on LQPDWHV¶ moral reflection found that a common strategy amongst them was to 
simply µJHWtheir heads GRZQ¶DQGWKXVto actively silence normative questions around wrongdoing.53  
It is clear that these kinds of feelings and actions - resentment, hostility, lack of control and retreat - 
are a significant barrier to the kinds of moral reflection and effective dialogue that a communicative 
criminal justice system is meant to embody.   
Finally, even if it is possible that imprisonment is able to produce some kind of moral 
transformation, the empirical evidence strongly suggests that it will not be of the type that Duff 
desires$IWHUDOOWKHSKHQRPHQRQRIµSULVRQLVDWLRQ¶ LQZKLFKWKHµ«IRONZD\VPRUHVFXVWRPVDQG
JHQHUDOFXOWXUH«¶RIWKHSULVRQDUHDGRSWHGE\LQPDWHVhas long been observed by criminologists.54  It 
was once thought that such changes in values stayed with offenders over the long-term, serving as a 
VHULRXV REVWDFOH WR RIIHQGHUV¶ UHKDELOLWDWLRQ and thus making it harder for offenders to adopt the 
changes in lifestyle necessary for desistance and successful reintegration into the wider community.55  
However, recent empirical studies suggest that the process is not linear, with some inmates 
deliberately turning away from these prison norms as they approach release.56  But whether 
prisonisation is experienced over the short or the long term, the fundamental point remains: 
imprisonment may sometimes facilitate a moral transformation, but it is one in which the norms and 
values of the prison are adopted, as opposed to a repentant understanding of moral wrongdoing.     
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Imprisonment LV H[WUHPHO\ XQOLNHO\ WR µVKRFN¶ SULVRQHUV LQto moral clarity and repentance.  
The empirical evidence in fact suggests that it is much more likely to KDYHRSSRVLWHHIIHFWVWRµGURZQ
RXW¶PRUDOreflection; to be met with resentment, despair, loss of control and withdrawal; and even to 
result in offenders adopting the values of the prison and other prisoners, rather than those of the wider 
community.  *LYHQ WKLV LW LVYHU\GLIILFXOW WR VHHDQ\ µUDWLRQDOFRQQHFWLRQ¶EHWZHHQ WKHSUDFWLFHRI
imprisonment and the communicative enterprise of punishment.  
 
4. Imprisonment as a Symbolically Appropriate Sanction 
However, there is another way in which Duff believes imprisonment can be appropriately 
communicative.  In fact, the most prominent and repeated reason that Duff gives for imprisonment 
having a role in a communicative system of punishment is WKDW LW FDQ VHUYH DV D µVymbolically 
DSSURSULDWH¶ sanction.  To explain, Duff argues that:  
[S)entencers should look for (or try to create) that particular sentence that will express most 
DSSRVLWHO\WKHFHQVXUHPHULWHGE\WKLVRIIHQGHU¶VFULPHDQGZKLFKZLOOEHDSSURSULDte to this 
particular offender.57 
Duff is essentially updating the old adage that µWKHpunishment must ILW WKHFULPH¶ to argue that the 
mode of punishment should appositely reflect and communicate the wrongful nature of the crime to 
the offender.58 
'XII¶VNH\FODLPLVWKDWEHFDXVHLPSULVRQPHQWH[FOXGHVWKHRIIHQGHUIURPWKHFRPPXQLW\LW
can sometimes be a symbolically appropriate sanction: 
The central message which imprisonment communicates is exclusion: it removes or excludes 
the offender from the community and his normal social relationships; and it must be justified 
as being necessary to give material and symbolic form to the judgment that his offence was so 
destructive of those moral and social bonds on which the community depends as to cast in 
doubt his membership of the community.59 
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The idea is that imprisonment gives expression to the fact that some crimes are so destructive of the 
values that keep the community together, that they make it impossible to live with an individual who 
commits them.60  For Duff, these are crimes entailing serious violence, including murder.61   
There is certainly something powerful about this particular line of argument.  After all, the 
physical exclusion of, for example, rapists and murderers from their community seems to send a 
message about the seriousness of their wrongdoing that is far more apposite than that which can be 
sent via education programmes, victim-offender mediation programmes or community sentences.  
Rapists and murderers have excluded themselves from society by violating its core values, so perhaps 
literally excluding them via incarceration in jail is the appropriate communicative response.62 In spite 
of this intuitive appeal, however, there are two important problems with this line of argument for 
justifying imprisonment. 
The first problem LVWKDW'XII¶V reasoning may once again prove much more than he wants it 
to.  That is to say, it may end up justifying imprisonment for a huge number of crimes ± perhaps even 
all crimes - and not just those involving serious violence.  To explain, Duff presumably focuses on 
crimes of serious violence and murder because they constitute violations of moral and social bonds 
that all societies, as he states, µdepend on¶,QRWKHUZRUGV a society simply cannot function properly 
without norms of respect for life and for bodily integrity.  But societies also depend on several other 
norms to function properly.  For example, a norm of respect for property is an absolutely essential part 
of DFRPPXQLW\¶VµPRUDODQGVRFLDOERQGV¶; once again, without some set of rules governing property 
relations, it is impossible for a society to function properly.  So if imprisonment is justified for those 
crimes that break the moral and social bonds that society depends on, it must surely also be justified 
for all property crimes.  
In fact, there is good reason to believe that in 'XII¶VLGHDO communicative system of criminal 
justice all crimes constitute violations of basic moral and social bonds, and thus that imprisonment is 
justified for all crimes.  To explain, Duff is sensitive to the critique of his theory from some liberals 
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that it is too intrusive: LW GHOLEHUDWHO\ LQWUXGHV LQWR LQGLYLGXDOV¶ PRUDO FRQVFLHQFH DQG VHQVLELOLWLHV
demanding that offenders confront their moral wrongdoing, and asking them to reflect, repent and 
reform.63  In response, Duff argues that in a community which values autonomy, the criminal law 
must be strictly constrained: only the most serious moral transgressions will be criminalised.64 As 
such, the scope for any penal sanction to result in the kinds of intrusions outlined above will be 
extremely limited.  But of course, if imprisonment is justified only for the most serious transgressions 
of social and moral bonds, and if all crimes simply by being crimes constitute such transgressions, 
imprisonment is justified for all criminal activity, all else being equal. Quite obviously, this 
conclusion UXQV GLUHFWO\ FRQWUDU\ WR 'XII¶V DLP WR UDGLFDOO\ UHGXFH WKH XVH RI LPSULVRQPHQW DV D
punitive sanction; in fact, it would seem to demand its extension in all societies. 
In response to such a critique, Duff might well propose that there are two thresholds of 
seriousness when it comes to criminal activity.  First, he might argue that only serious transgressions 
of social and moral bonds ought to be criminalised.  And then he might further claim that only a 
subset of those transgressions ± the µmost serious of the serious¶ - merit the particular sanction of 
imprisonment.  This could be argued to communicate to offenders that all criminal activity breaks 
important bonds that societies depend upon, but there are some actions which constitute bigger breaks 
than others.  This response is certainly plausible.  Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out that what 
FRQVWLWXWHV WKH µPRVW VHULRXV RI VHULRXV¶ WUDQVJUHVVLRQV XQGHU WKLV WKHRU\ ZLOO QRW LQFOXGH DV 'XII
seems to suppose, all and only violent acts.  For under this communicative theory, the seriousness of a 
crime is a function of the extent to which it breaks social bonds.  But it is worth noting that many 
violent crimes are rather isolated crimes of passion that pose minimal threat to the social bonds 
holding a community together.  Instead, the most serious of serious crimes will seem to include such 
things as acts of terror and the promotion of insurgent ideas.  After all, such radical actions strike 
explicitly and directly at the moral and social bonds of a political community.  But it seems odd to 
regard these sorts of crime as those which most urgently require the communication of exclusion to 
their perpetrators.  After all, those who commit such acts are exactly the type of people who have 
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already reflected on the deepest values of their society ± and have come to reject them fundamentally.   
It is hard then to see the useful purpose in communicating to such individuals the fact that their 
actions constitute a fundamental break with society; for this is something that is already abundantly 
clear to them.   
Duff will no doubt respond to such a claim in the same way that he responds to criticisms of 
his theory which argue that communication with psychopaths is near impossible.  For recall that Duff 
argues that it is the attempt to communicate deserved censure that is vital under his theory, rather than 
the success of any particular communicative enterprise.65  But even if we accept this line of argument, 
a more fundamental problem remains with the idea of communicating exclusion through 
imprisonment. For the simple fact is that communication and exclusion are in tension with one 
another, and it is hard to see how they can be reconciled in a satisfactory way.  For as we will see in 
what follows, if emphasis is given to exclusion, as embodied by the physical separation of offenders 
through imprisonment, then the possibility of meaningful communication fades; and if emphasis is 
given to improving that communication, say by utilising less restrictive and more rehabilitative forms 
of imprisonment, then the message of exclusion is radically undermined.  Given this tension, the very 
SRVVLELOLW\RIµFRPPXQLFDWLQJH[FOXVLRQ¶LVKDUGWRPDNHPXFKVHQVHRI   
Let us start then by looking at how excluding offenders through imprisonment undermines the 
communicative enterprise of punishment.  Recall that the communicative theory of punishment is 
designed to improve upon expressivist theories by arguing that the state must move beyond sending 
simple messages of censure to offenders, but must instead facilitate a moral dialogue between the 
state and responsible moral agents.  A genuine two-way dialogue over criminal wrongdoing entails 
the expression of censure from state to offender, but it also possesses two other crucial elements: it 
must express censure in such a way that is likely to facilitate understanding of the message; and it 
must do so in way which is rationally connected to eliciting an appropriate response.66  Now clearly 
such forms of dialogue are going to be extremely difficult for any mode of punishment to realise.  
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Indeed, Kimberley Brownlee has argued that the inherent inequality in status between the state and 
offender undermines the very possibility of reciprocal punitive dialogue.67  But this seems too strong.  
After all, it does seem possible for genuine dialogue to take place between parties of unequal status, 
such as between parents and their young children, or between schoolteachers and their pupils.  
Moreover, it is also possible to imagine suitably tailored bundles of sanctions which could meet the 
basic conditions of a genuine punitive communicative dialogue outlined above.  For example, one can 
at least imagine a bundle of sanctions that included say, victim-offender mediation programmes and 
education programmes, that if packaged and delivered properly could facilitate an appropriate 
understanding and response from an offender.   What is much more difficult to imagine, on the other 
hand, is how a period of incarceration in jail could by itself constitute such a communicative dialogue.   
For while imprisonment undoubtedly expresses censure, it does not seem rationally connected 
to the other two features of a genuine communicative dialogue: helping the offender achieve 
understanding; and eliciting an appropriate response.   We have already seen in the previous section 
how certain features of prison life and the way it is experienced impede the possibility that moral 
messages will be received and understood by offenders.  But even if messages of exclusion can 
somehow get across and be understood, there are powerful reasons to doubt that prisoners will be able 
to respond appropriately to them.  For it is crucial to remember that exclusion contradicts one of the 
key responses that communicative punishment is meant to facilitate: reintegration.  Communicative 
punishment is designed to persuade offenders to repent, reform and achieve reconciliation; and 
together such responses are hoped to reintegrate the offender into the community.  The idea is that the 
understanding which offenders achieve and the penance they serve will enable them to repair the rift 
they have caused with society, and live successfully by its values.  But such reintegration is surely 
best achieved by wrongdoers paying their penance within and to their community.  This is quite 
simply because the empirical evidence strongly suggests that confinement and exclusion disrupts 
RIIHQGHUV¶ DELOLW\ to make something of their lives and find a role in the conventional channels 
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afforded to them by society.68  Put directly, the evidence shows that prison impedes rather than 
enables reintegration.  Indeed, Duff himself acknowledges this, citing the exclusionary nature of 
imprisonment as the reason why our employment of imprisonment should be radically reduced.69  But 
given that properly communicative sanctions must not merely express a message of moral 
wrongdoing to offenders, but must also do so in a way that is likely to elicit understanding of that 
message and facilitate an appropriate response, it is unclear why Duff advocates even its limited use. 
 Duff might concede that proper communicative dialogue is impossible within most existing 
and established forms of imprisonment.  However, he will justifiably respond that his is a theory of 
punishment as it ought to be, and thus it must also be a theory of imprisonment as it ought to be.  
What we should ask, then, is not whether existing forms of imprisonment can appropriately 
communicate the message of exclusion, but whether the most suitable prisons we can imagine can 
achieve such effective communication.  Recall then that the problem with imprisonment is that it 
impedes understanding of the moral message being communicated, and also fails to elicit the 
appropriate response from offenders.  How might such problems be overcome?  While Duff does not 
provide detailed answers to these questions, he does in one place advocate less exclusionary forms of 
imprisonment, such as curfews and intermittent sentences.70 On the same basis, we can expand on this 
point to surmise that it is also possible that the appropriate use of open prisons might alleviate some of 
the problems with eliciting a meaningful dialogue described above.  Indeed, curfews, intermittent 
sentences and open prisons all seem to have communicative potential on three levels.  First of all, it is 
certainly possible that such forms of incarceration DUHOHVVOLNHO\WRµGURZQRXW¶WKHPRUDOPHVVDJHRI
censure.  Given the greater range of freedoms that such forms of imprisonment take, it is likely that 
they will reduce the pains of imprisonment, the levels of resentment, hostility and loss of control, and 
the phenomenon of prisonisation amongst inmates.  In turn, this may make offenders more receptive 
to the moral messages that the punitive sanction is attempting to communicate.  Secondly, these forms 
of imprisonment may be more useful in enabling offenders to understand that message, since they can 
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more easily incorporate other sanctions such as victim-offender mediation, education programmes and 
community service orders that are tailored to the specific QDWXUHRI WKHRIIHQGHUV¶FULPLQDODFWLYLW\
Finally, curfews, intermittent sentences and open prisons allow for much more engagement with the 
wider community, thus reducing the problem of exclusion and facilitating the possibility of successful 
reintegration.  For example, these forms of confinement are usually coupled with job placements, 
community service, and forms of training which all provide a clear connection to the core 
communicative goal of reintegration.  In this way, it may be possible to develop forms of 
imprisonment that can realise a genuine punitive communicative dialogue.   
The problem, of course, is that by shifting the emphasis of the penal system in this way to 
ameliorate communication, the message of exclusion gets lost in the process.  To reiterate, Duff 
believes that it important for imprisonment to communicate exclusion; it is the exclusion that prison 
entails which makes it a symbolically appropriate sanction.  Crucially, however, all of these attempts 
to make prison processes better at fostering communicative dialogue ± intermittent sentences, 
curfews, open prisons ± radically water down the exclusionary nature of imprisonment.  So while the 
move to less exclusionary forms incarceration might make prison more effective at communicating, it 
also radically undermines what is meant to be its core message.  And indeed, there is some empirical 
evidence which suggests that these less exclusionary forms of confinement do send confusing 
messages.   For example, one of the most famous open prisons is Bastoy in Norway ± sometimes 
referred to as µPrison Island¶.  Bastoy is large, open, with minimum security and provides offenders 
with lots of contact with the wider community.  However, recent research suggests that inmates there 
can become confused about their different roles within and outside of the prison environment, as well 
as the different rules that apply.  Offenders get a taste of freedom and of life after release, but this can 
be bittersweet: they grow anxious about the prospect of returning to the community, and still have to 
suffer the frustration of ultimately remaining in rule-governed custody.71  The point here is not that 
even these forms of imprisonment cause suffering and hardship to the offenders, for obviously all 
forms of punishment do that.  Rather the point is that they send confusing messages to inmates.  For a 
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theory which justifies forms of sanction by their communicative potential, such confusion is deeply 
problematic.  
In summary, we can see that there is a real problem in using prison as a vehicle to 
communicate the message of exclusion.  If imprisonment is clearly exclusionary, then its moral 
message is unlikely to be heard or responded to in the appropriate manner.  But if we try and make 
prison more effective at communicating, it thereby becomes less exclusionary, undermining the key 
moral message that Duff wants to be communicated.     
 
5. Conclusion 
The conclusion of this paper must be that this particular appeal hearing for prison has failed: 
LPSULVRQPHQWFDQQRWEHMXVWLILHGE\DSSHDOWR'XII¶VFRPPXQLFDWLYHWKHRU\RISXQLVKPHQW,WFDQQRW
be justified as an ultimate sanction for those that fail to comply or resist other forms of punishment.  
This is because other sanctions could also serve that role, and also because the very use of threats 
manipulates offenders rather than treats them respectfully as responsible moral agents.  Nor can prison 
be justified as a shock to repentant understanding.  This is because the idea that harsh punishments 
can serve this goal may end up justifying corporal and other cruel punishments.  Moreover, there is 
good reason to believe that imprisonment (and corporal punishment) is a poor vehicle for the delivery 
of moral messages.  Finally, imprisonment cannot be justified as a symbolically appropriate response 
to the most serious crimes.  This is because all crimes undermine important social and moral bonds, 
which would seem to make prison a proper response to all crimes.  Furthermore, while imprisonment 
may be able to express the message of exclusion to criminals, it fails to engage them in a meaningful 
dialogue in which the offender is likely to hear the message and respond to it appropriately.  
Crucially, attempts to overcome this problem and improve the communicative potential of 
imprisonment ± through forms of curfews, intermittent sentencing and open prisons ± only end up 
confusing the message of exclusion. 
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 If imprisonment is to be justified, then, we will have to look again at the punitive aims 
discussed and dismissed by Mathieson.  Or we might seek to justify it via other punitive aims that he 
did not consider.  Alternatively, there is also the possibility that imprisonment might be justified on 
the grounds that it serves social goals that are not strictly punitive.72  The final possibility, of course, 
is that Mathieson was right that prison simply cannot be justified, and that all societies must work 
towards its abolition.  Whatever the case, because of the serious harms that imprisonment imposes, 
and its widespread use, it is vital that these possibilities are pursued and that the institution receives 
far more ethical attention from philosophers than it has to date.     
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